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Introduction 
Humans have been interested in animals since the ancient times. This interest is two 
folded: on the one hand, we are interested in animals themselves, how they are, how they 
behave, how different species interact with each other, etc. On the other hand, we are also 
interested in what animals can tell us about ourselves; this interest is especially paramount 
in research done in the areas of animal intelligence and language skills. Via investigating 
animal language skills and intelligence, we have an opportunity to find out something 
about the development of human language and intelligence. This interest has prompted 
many scientific inquiries about animal intelligence, mind, language etc.  
Central question of my thesis is: are these animal studies objective? At first glance it 
might not seem such a problematic question after all, but if we consider the specificities of 
studying animals, the question becomes very important. Different species of animals have 
and are being studied, and all these species have their own peculiarities. Even individual 
animals have their own wants, needs, moods, desires, etc. We also should not forget that 
animals seem cute to humans, thus eliciting tender emotions. All this might make working 
with animals quite difficult. It is definitely different from working with inanimate objects, 
or small living organisms such as bacteria. After all, investigating animals consists quite 
often in mutual interaction between the animal and the researcher. These types of studies 
are in my opinion the most in danger of losing objectivity, since there is the possibility of 
the scientist and the animal becoming too close. But the chances of learning much about 
animals are also highest in such studies. This is the reason why we cannot just dismiss 
them and concentrate on other types of more safe studies. 
Objectivity is necessary trait to distinguish a scientific study from pseudoscience but 
unfortunately it is not so clear what objectivity is. There seems to be an intrinsic 
understanding of objectivity that humans possess, but this understanding of objectivity 
does not match well with animal research since this intuitive understanding of objectivity 
rejects subjective element. Therefore animal research is considered less objective than 
other sciences. My aim in this thesis is to show that this intrinsic understanding of 
objectivity is not the same as scientific objectivity and according to the account of 
scientific objectivity animal studies are objective.  
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In my thesis, I will concentrate on the types of animal studies where the possibility of 
compromised objectivity is the highest. I have chosen to concentrate on symbolic 
communication research and mindreading research since both of these kinds of study could 
reveal something important about animal minds and intelligence. There is also a possibility 
of uncovering something important about human minds and intelligence in comparison to 
animals. The nature of these inquiries demands close and extensive work with animals. But 
this is also the reason why there is a risk of compromised objectivity. 
In the first chapter, I will discuss the notion of objectivity and clarify the term in order 
to find the best account of scientific objectivity to suit all scientific research. In chapter 
two, I will consider the wider questions about animal research and objectivity; mainly the 
question of animal research seeming less objective than other scientific inquiries and if 
animal studies need an account of objectivity of their own because of that. Then I will turn 
to examples of animal studies. In chapter three, I will look at the symbolic communication 
research, and in chapter four, I will analyse animal mindreading studies. I have chosen to 
analyse these two studies, since they both have been on-going for over thirty years and 
they show promise to uncover something important about language and intelligence 
development in animals and humans alike.  
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1. Objectivity 
There are many different accounts of objectivity and many authors have devised their 
own accounts of objectivity to suit their purposes and context. Also, there seems to be 
some sort of intrinsic and intuitive understanding of what objectivity is that does not work 
for scientific objectivity. Since accounts of scientific objectivity tend to be incomplete or 
invidious, it is important to assess different types of scientific objectivity.  My goal in this 
chapter is to find one account of objectivity that would be best for assessing objectivity of 
different scientific studies, including animal research. First I will assess the common 
intrinsic understanding of objectivity in sub-chapter 1.1. Secondly, I will turn to accounts 
of scientific objectivity presented by Allan Megill, Sergio Sismondo and Helen E. Longino 
in sub-chapters 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4. I will assess these different ideas of objectivity and try to 
find among them one superior contradiction free account of objectivity to suit all science. 
1.1 What is objectivity? 
According to Oxford dictionary of English objectivity is defined as „the quality of 
being objective―. (Oxford dictionary of English webpage, 2017) This definition is not 
much help to me, unless I know what is meant by objective. So, next I will look at the 
definition of objective. In the dictionary, objective is defined as:  
1. „(of a person or their judgment) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in 
considering and representing facts. 
1.1 Not dependent on the mind for existence; actual―. (Oxford dictionary of English 
webpage, 2017) 
Now the picture becomes a bit clearer, but at the same time, also new questions arise. 
There are two main problems with this definition.  
The first problem is the demand for detachment from our personal feelings and 
opinions; can we really be completely uninfluenced by our feelings or opinions? I find that 
to be doubtful. As I already mentioned in the introduction, animal research is in danger of 
being influenced by our feelings, since animals tend to elicit emotions out of humans. 
Scientists are not free from this threat. Also, this is not a problem only in animal research 
but in all sciences. I think that it is impossible for scientists to remain completely 
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uninfluenced by their personal feelings or opinions, since this subjective element is always 
haunting in the background of scientific work.  
The second problem with this definition is that it is expressed for a singular, individual 
person, but scientific research is not done by just one individual, science is a collective 
activity, there are many scientists, working alone or together. This definition of objectivity 
does not take the cooperative nature of science into account. 
The definition of objectivity by Oxford dictionary of English‘s indicates how 
objectivity might be understood in standard everyday purposes and I think that this 
definition of objectivity corresponds to the intrinsic universal understanding of objectivity, 
but it misses the very nature of scientific research and therefore I shall have to elaborate 
the concept of scientific objectivity in greater detail.  
Next I will turn to the accounts of scientific objectivity presented by Allan Megill, 
Sergio Sismondo and Helen E. Longino. I will analyze them to find one account among 
these to best judge the objectivity of scientific research  
1.2 Four senses of objectivity 
Megill (Megill, 1994, pp. 1-11) distinguishes between four senses of objectivity:  
1. The Absolute Sense of Objectivity  
2. The Disciplinary Sense of Objectivity  
3. The Dialectical Sense of Objectivity  
4. The Procedural Sense of Objectivity.  
I will look each of them more closely. 
By the absolute sense of objectivity Megill (Megill, 1994, pp. 2-5) means 
philosophical objectivity. Absolute sense of objectivity comes from Kant and means that 
things are represented as they really are. The main problem with this understanding of 
objectivity is that it is unachievable and therefore limited, if taken to extreme we get view 
from nowhere. In 20th century objectivity in this sense is taken more as a matter of 
arriving at criteria for judging claims to have represented things as they really are. It is 
absolute in the hold it ought to have on us as rational beings.  
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Megill (Megill, 1994, pp. 5-7) presents the disciplinary sense of objectivity as an 
alternative to absolute sense of objectivity valid for specific disciplinary field of science. 
The disciplinary sense of objectivity emphasizes particular, yet authoritative, disciplinary 
criteria. Consensus among the members of particular research communities is as its 
standard of objectivity.  
The third sense of objectivity that Megill (Megill, 1994, pp. 7-10) describes is the 
dialectical sense of objectivity. The dialectical sense of objectivity unlike the absolute or 
disciplinary sense of objectivity holds a positive attitude towards the subjective. It states, 
that subjectivity is indispensable to the constituting of objects. Doing is preferred over 
viewing. This applies to areas of cultural and social research, humanities and social 
sciences where motives, cultural practices, traditions, reasons of behaviour, etc are 
explored. For objective account of the cultural practices an understanding of the subjective 
causes and reasons is necessary. 
Lastly Megill (Megill, 1994, pp. 10-11) presents the procedural sense of objectivity. 
The procedural sense of objectivity is impersonal method of investigation or 
administration. Objectivity in the procedural sense should be seen as a set of rules of 
procedure for scientists to follow for eliminating any subjective element. 
The problem with Megill`s distinctions is that I have four senses of scientific 
objectivity to choose from; the question now is, which one of them is the utmost to judge 
the objectivity of a scientific study? They all have their strengths but also their weaknesses.  
The absolute sense of objectivity to me seems to be too demanding but at the same 
time also limited. Everything else left aside, if we think about animals, then how we can 
ever be sure that the claims we make about animals really represent them. Besides facts 
and claims we have other variables at play here. Our personal beliefs and feelings, animal`s 
behavioural peculiarities, and even the fact, that we really do not know much about 
animal`s inner mentalist capabilities and workings. Absolute objectivity does not really 
take those things into account. It is too demanding in the sense that according to absolute 
sense of objectivity the scientists should see things as they really are without any 
subjective input. I do not think that this could be humanly possible, in any scientific 
research. Because of this demand it is also limited; it could apply to a very few scientific 
inquiries if any at all. So absolute sense of objectivity at best could be an ideal towards 
witch scientists can strive for, but it has very few, if any, practical uses.  
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Compared to absolute sense of objectivity I think that the disciplinary sense of 
objectivity could be more useful. According to disciplinary sense of objectivity, if there is 
consensus among the researchers in a disciplinary community, there is also objectivity. But 
the disciplinary sense of objectivity is also limited. It is quite easy to imagine different 
rival groups of research communities with various incommensurable ideas about 
objectivity. How then can we say which one of them is right? In animal research we do not 
even have to imagine such a thing happening, because it is a real problem there. And it is 
not a problem only in animal research but in other sciences, too. The problem with the 
disciplinary sense of objectivity is that it is always relative to a community. It does not 
give us unified account of objectivity but instead the possibility of many different groups 
with their own ideas about objectivity. I think that this sort of relative objectivity would be 
more confusing than helpful if we want to assess the objectivity of scientific studies. With 
the disciplinary sense of objectivity we also have the same questions about subjectivity 
rising as with the absolute sense of objectivity, since disciplinary sense of objectivity is 
similarly against the subjective element in sciences.  
Dialectical sense of objectivity holds a more positive attitude towards subjectivity, but 
this positive attitude is at the same time what limits it. Dialectical sense of objectivity 
could be useful in certain types of research, where it is impossible to operate without the 
subjective input, but we cannot apply it to all science. While holding a positive attitude 
towards subjectivity in sciences the dialectical sense of objectivity lacks universality in the 
sense, that it could be applicable to all sciences.  
Procedural sense of objectivity is also limited. There are many different ways of 
scientific research and we cannot reduce them all to the following of rules. This type of 
objectivity is useful if we have a fixed set of rules to follow, but what then would happen 
to scientific studies where there are no such rules or where such rules have not yet been 
formulated? This question becomes important if we consider for example the work done in 
experimental fields of science, or the social sciences. Another problem here is if following 
the rules is really enough to achieve objectivity. 
All of Megill`s four senses of objectivity have their limitations: absolute sense of 
objectivity is too demanding, disciplinary sense of objectivity could lead us to relativism, 
dialectical and procedural senses of objectivity can be useful in certain scientific inquiries 
but they do not apply to all scientific studies. The first two senses of objectivity strive to be 
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universal, but do not take account the inescapable subjective element in science; and the 
last two senses of objectivity are too particular, they can apply to some sciences but not all.  
What is really needed is an account of objectivity that is universal enough to apply to 
science in general, but at the same time, flexible enough to consider the peculiarities and 
differences of various scientific inquiries. Among Megill`s four senses of objectivity, there 
is no one such account of objectivity. 
1.3 Formal objectivity 
In his book An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies Sismondo (Sismondo, 
2004) distinguishes between an absolute objectivity and formal objectivity. Absolute 
objectivity in his use of the term coincides with Megill`s absolute sense of objectivity. 
Formal objectivity is the ideal of perfect formal procedures necessary for scientific work. 
Objective scientist in this sense would follow the rules with machinelike precision. 
(Sismondo, 2004, pp. 113-114) Sismondo`s formal objectivity seems most similar to 
Megill`s procedural sense of objectivity only with a promise of wider universality. 
Sismondo finds that absolute objectivity could at best be a vague ideal but it is very 
hard to recognize when it really is achieved. (Sismondo, 2004, p. 114) Formal objectivity 
is much more tangible; it is something that people construct under right social situations. 
(Sismondo, 2004, p. 117) 
Sismondo`s formal objectivity is constructed by keeping in mind the needs and 
interests of the discipline of Science and Technology Studies (STS). It could of course 
apply to animal research also, but I have my doubts about the suitability of this match. 
Firstly, in animal research there is hard to find some overall unified formal procedures for 
scientists to follow. There are many ways of how to research the animals. Procedures for 
observing animals in the wild are different from setting up experiments for animals in 
laboratory, and experiments done in a laboratory can differ greatly from the ones done in 
the zoos.  
And there are also differences in investigating different species. What works for apes, 
might not work for monkeys or birds. Frans de Waal (de Waal, 2016, pp. 13-15) has 
illustrated this difference with an example of gibbons‘ problem solving tests. Gibbons were 
presented with a banana outside their cage and a stick. Chimpanzees would pick up the 
stick and pull the banana closer, but gibbons failed to do so test after test. These results 
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were weird since gibbons belong to the same family with humans and apes. It would be 
reasonable to assume then that they too could solve this problem quickly. Only after the 
realization that gibbons are arboreal and their hands are unsuitable for picking things up 
from flat surfaces could scientists solve this mystery. They devised different tests, where 
the tools necessary for solving the test were hung up and therefore better for gibbons to 
reach. After these modifications gibbons solved the problems quickly just as the other 
apes.  
This example of gibbons‘ problem solving tests show quite clearly how finding some 
unified procedural rules could be problematic in animal research. By following just one set 
of rules about how to conduct experiments the scientists might miss something important 
about the animals they are researching. I think that this problem is not confined only to the 
area of animal research, but it could happen in other sciences too. 
Second problem with formal objectivity is the demand for machinelike precision. It is 
easy to see how that can be achieved in a controlled environment researching something 
inanimate. Animal research tends to take place in quite uncontrolled environments, be that 
in the wild or in the zoos. And even if animal research takes place in a lab, there is still the 
problem of animal behaviour. It is hard to keep up to machinelike precision when your test 
animal is having a bad mood or is just bored and keeps on interrupting the testing.  
Formal objectivity therefore is not a very good fit for animal research. There are of 
course procedural rules in animal research about how to conduct experiments, how to 
handle the animals and so on, but the problem I have with formal objectivity is that it 
seems to be limited to only formal procedures. This problem is not limited only to animal 
research, but to the other areas of science too. Sismondo`s formal objectivity faces the 
same problem as Megill`s procedural sense of objectivity: can science be reduced to just 
formal procedures? It could be done in some areas of science, like chemical lab 
experiments, but what about everything else, that does not fit into following procedural 
rules? What I need is an account of objectivity that encompasses other areas of science 
besides those where we can talk about objectivity in the sense of following the procedural 
rules.  
1.4 Social objectivity 
Longino (Longino, 1990, p.63) has said about objectivity, that:  
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Objectivity is a characteristic ascribed variously to beliefs, individuals, theories, observations, 
and methods of inquiry. It is generally thought to involve the willingness to let our beliefs be 
determined by ―the facts‖ or by some impartial and nonarbitrary criteria rather than by our 
wishes as to how things ought to be.  
This description of objectivity exemplifies the basic universal understanding of 
objectivity, but as I already mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, this basic 
understanding of objectivity is not the same as scientific objectivity. For Longino 
(Longino, 1990) this description of objectivity applies only to individuals, and therefore 
not suitable for science, since science has a social character. She says: „What I wish 
particularly to stress is that the objectivity of scientific inquiry is a consequence of this 
inquiry`s being a social, and not an individual, enterprise‖. (Longino, 1990, p.67)  
According to Longino (Longino, 1990, p. 68-69) scientific knowledge is produced 
when scientific community critically assesses, corrects and modifies the work of individual 
scientist. This means that experiments are repeated by other scientists, hypotheses and 
theories are critically examined and reformulated before they can be accepted as part of 
scientific canon. Scientific knowledge is produced by a community of all scientists and it 
transcends individual or sub-communities contributions.  
For Longino (Longino, 1990, p. 74-76), science is done in a social setting, it is a 
community practice and objectivity is a characteristic of this community practice. Since 
hypotheses and their accordance to evidence is mediated by background assumptions, that 
might not be available to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation the objectivity of 
scientific methods cannot be identified with only empirical features. Through conceptual 
criticism, we have a possibility of identifying any subjective background assumptions and 
only through this conceptual criticism can scientific community guarantee it`s objectivity.  
Thus, criticism and answering to it is what gives the scientific community it´s 
objectivity. I think that of the kinds of objectivity discussed in this thesis, only the account 
of social objectivity might provide us with a productive approach to scientific objectivity. 
It does not demand unachievable levels of detachment from subjectivity like the absolute 
sense of objectivity did. Instead social objectivity recognizes that there is indeed a 
subjective element in science and offers us a way to assess and limit this subjectivity via 
mutual criticism. Another strength of social objectivity is that it involves the whole 
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scientific community; this means in principle all the scientists in the world who belong to 
the community. This gives social objectivity its universality.   
A by-product of social objectivity is that Longino`s social objectivity comes in 
degrees: 
„Scientific communities will be objective to the degree that they satisfy four criteria 
necessary for achieving the transformative dimension of critical discourse:  
1. Recognized avenues for criticism;  
2. Shared standards;  
3. Community response;  
4. Equality of intellectual authority―. (Longino, 1990, pp. 76-79)  
Criticism plays a significant role in the objectivity of a scientific community, but this 
criticism cannot be just any criticism. For criticism to be useful and productive it needs to 
adhere to the four criteria presented by Longino. I will discuss each of them more closely. 
By recognized avenues for criticism Longino (Longino, 1990, pp. 76-77) means that 
criticism can be presented in academic journals, conferences etc. Peer review plays big part 
in here. This criterion also means that criticism is valued equally with original research.  
By shared standards Longono (Longino, 1990, pp. 77-78) means, that there are public 
standards or criteria that members of scientific community uphold. Without such shared 
standards criticism loses its meaningfulness.  
Community response for Longino (Longino, 1990, p. 78) means that the beliefs of the 
members of a scientific community can change in the result of criticism. It does not mean 
that those who are criticized have to give up their beliefs, but they have to keep in mind the 
critical discussions going on about their beliefs.  
By equality of intellectual authority Longino (Longino, 1990, pp. 78-79) means, that 
those who are in power do not silence those who disagree with them. Majority in power 
positions should not discard the opinions or beliefs of the minority and discriminating 
someone`s views based on their race or sex should not be tolerated. 
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I think, that Longino`s social objectivity is the best account of objectivity at hand by 
which to judge a scientific study, including animal research. It is universal enough to 
encompass all different types of scientific research, but it is not unreasonably demanding 
since social objectivity admits to the subjective element in science.  
With social objectivity Longino also gives us a way to assess the objectivity of some 
scientific research: this is answering to criticism. In my opinion this is the biggest selling 
point of social objectivity, because through assessing researchers‘ answers to criticism we 
have a good way of assessing the objectivity of many different types of researches. This 
point is what was missing in Megill`s four senses of objectivity and Sismondo`s formal 
objectivity, at least not in such an universal scale like Longino presents us.  
Now that I have found a plausible account of objectivity it is time to turn back to 
animal research. In the next chapter I will analyze the more general questions about animal 
research and objectivity in light of Longino`s social objectivity, and in chapter three and 
four I will illustrate this analysis with examples of specific research programs.   
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2. Do animal studies need new kind of objectivity? 
In the previous chapter, I briefly noted how animal research might appear to be 
incompatible with some accounts of objectivity; now it is time to consider this problem 
more fully. 
Animal studies are bound to contain some form of subjectivity, especially in studies 
where animals and researchers have to interact very closely, but this subjective element is 
also a reason why some forms of animal studies are considered less objective and therefore 
less scientific than other scientific studies.  This assessment is problematic since it banishes 
some promising animal studies in the periphery of scientific world. But at the same time 
these animal researches could tell us much about animals and ourselves.  
We cannot expect animal research to be objective on the same grounds as chemistry or 
physics. In animal studies, scientists are investigating living beings with minds of their 
own and this research is different from that of chemistry or physics. There is much more 
subjective input in animal research than in the ―hard sciences‖. This intrinsic subjectivity 
poses a problem for assessing the objectivity of animal research, since the basic universal 
understanding of objectivity seems to correspond with absolute sense of objectivity in 
regard of discarding any subjective input in a research.  
In their book Objectivity Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (Daston, Galison, 2007) 
have traced the history of this absolute understanding of objectivity. This extreme denial of 
subjectivity came to play sharply in 19
th
 century science and it was a reaction to the crisis 
that the science was facing at the time. Since science in the 19
th
 century was developing so 
fast the scientists needed some safe, reliable grounds upon which to found their research 
on. Their answer to that problem was to eliminate any type of subjectivity from the 
sciences and from the scientists.  
At the time it was a necessary move, but the question today is, if it still is necessary? I 
think that it is not necessary any more since science has changed from the 19
th
 century and 
we are able to see the meaning and role of subjectivity in certain disciplines. Also, we now 
are able to incorporate both, some subjectivity and the aim of objective knowledge in our 
research. We have better accounts of objectivity suit well with our contemporary science.  
Thus we do not need to pursue the absolute objectivity at any cost. Clinging blindly to 
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unattainable ideal would hamper the development of science and exclude many fields of 
science with the intrinsic subjective element. Since to some degree subjectivity is still 
unavoidable in all sciences, adhering to the absolute sense of objectivity would render most 
sciences far from objective and therefore undermine their feasibility. That would be a very 
unfortunate result. 
Thus, as it is clear that classical ideal of absolute objectivity and the intrinsic wider 
understanding of objectivity that conforms to it might not be the best way to judge animal 
research or any research, this poses us with a question: do animal studies need their own 
disciplinary account of objectivity? As pointed out in the previous chapter, there are many 
alternatives to absolute sense of objectivity, some of those suiting animal research to some 
extent, but most of them are suffering from their limited nature except for one: social 
objectivity.  
Longino`s social objectivity seems to be free of the difficulties the other alternatives 
suffer from, as it really is the only option  for the judgement on the objectivity of any 
scientific study including animal research. Also, the account of social objectivity is not 
entirely free of problems: there is always a possibility that the majority of scientific 
community might be wrong in their judgment. This is a possibility, but given the assumed 
perspective of possible future criticism, social objectivity is still preferable. If we were to 
follow the unattainable ideal of absolute objectivity, there would be little chance of any 
scientific research ever living up to that ideal. This applies especially to the types of animal 
research that I analyse in my thesis. In case of close, interactive work with animals, 
eliminating all subjective elements is impossible and perhaps even hampering to the 
research.  
The strength of the social objectivity is that it leaves room for correcting errors. Even 
if scientific community deems some type of research to be less objective, the scientists still 
have a way to sway that opinion. In the case of animal studies, if animal researchers keep 
up with the criticism, give their reasoned replies, consider possible misrepresentations and 
change their tests and methods when necessary, it is possible to sway majority opinions 
about their research. Therefore, I find Longino`s social objectivity as a good account to 
serve well the aim of evaluating the objectivity of animal research. There is no explicit 
need for animal research to develop its own special account of objectivity. If we were to 
look animal research in light of absolute objectivity, then yes, the question would arise, 
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that maybe animal research needs an account of objectivity of its own. But social 
objectivity saves us from inventing that. Social objectivity does not exclude the subjective 
and interpretive parts of animal research, instead it advices researchers themselves to pay 
attention to alternative positions about their research and give well-rounded replies to 
criticism. In the end this helps research develop and remain objective at the same time.  
In the next two chapters, I will illustrate the suitability of social objectivity to animal 
research with examples. I have chosen to analyse two well-known research projects where 
we could gain valuable knowledge about animal language skills and intelligence to show 
that we have a good way to assess the objectivity of these animal studies. In chapter three, 
I will concentrate on the symbolic communication research and in chapter four; I will 
analyse the mindreading experiments. 
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3. Symbolic communication research 
In this chapter, I will discuss symbolic communication research. I will first introduce 
briefly what symbolic communication research is like, and then I will analyse the 
objectivity of some main research projects in the field in light of Longino`s account of 
social objectivity. 
3.1 What is symbolic communication research? 
In this sub-chapter, I give a brief introduction to symbolic communication research 
also known as animal language research projects. Contrary to what the name of such 
projects might suggest, the idea of those projects is to teach animals human language and 
not to explore the animal`s own language. By teaching animals a human language the 
scientists hope to learn more about the origins of language production and also about 
animals linguistic capabilities. 
This interest to teach animals symbolic language systems arose in the 20th century. 
First forays to this subject were unsuccessful, because the scientists tried to teach 
chimpanzee‘s spoken human language. After the discoveries about chimpanzees‘ vocal 
apparatus and its unsuitability for spoken human language, the focus shifted on teaching 
chimpanzees‘ a sign language and other artificial symbolic communication systems. 
(Andrews, 2016) These attempts were successful. First of those was Beatrix and Allen 
Gardner`s Project Washoe. They used shaping, moulding and modelling to train 
chimpanzee Washoe to form at least 132 American Sign Language (ASL) signs. This 
experiment took place in a social setting to mimic children`s language-learning 
environment. This success was soon repeated by other researchers working in the field, but 
there were also many sceptics. (Andrews, 2016) 
The field flourished despite the critics. New projects were started and many different 
species were taught and investigated – among them were other apes, dolphins, parrots and 
sea lions. Besides Washoe, other famous animals include Koko, the talking gorilla, and 
bonobo Kanzi, who acquired lexigram symbols spontaneously. Advocates of those 
research programs argued that these studies will reveal something essential about the 
relationship between language and mind, the evolution of human language, and the roles 
played by developing and scaffolding in human language. (Andrews, 2016) 
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In light of symbolic communication research, many questions and problems were 
brought up. These include the questions about animal language, intelligence and minds: are 
animals in these projects really using language, how to define language, what do such 
success stories tell us about animal and human capabilities etc. To take seriously the 
answers to these questions that animal researchers give, it is important to assess how 
objective these projects are. Before we can do that, we must take a look at the criticism of 
symbolic communication research projects, since criticism and answering to it are one of 
the main ways to assess the objectivity of scientific study according to Longino`s social 
objectivity. This is the topic of next sub-chapter.  
3.2 Criticism of symbolic communication research 
There has been and still is a lot of criticism about symbolic communication research. 
For most of the critics, these studies show that humans have the ability to train animals to 
do nearly anything humans want. Noam Chomsky has been very critical towards the claim 
that animals have acquired language. For him, language requires syntax, and he could not 
see any syntax in all the communication systems of the animals. He pointed out that human 
children learn language effortlessly while animals have to be taught. Language for him is 
innate, so if animals had the capacity for learning language, they would speak without 
human intervention. (Andrews, 2016) 
Chomsky`s criticism as well as of many others about language or the lack of it in these 
programs might be justified to some extent, but the nature of the problem with the 
language question depends on how do we define language. If language is defined in very 
general terms, the animals could also qualify as language users, but if language is defined 
as something more complex, such as in Chomsky‘s case, then according to that definition 
animals do not have language.  
Temple Grandin (Grandin, 2005) has summarized this language debate as scientists 
forming two camps: on one hand, we have people who think that human language and 
animal communication are two separate and distinct things, and on the other hand, there 
are people who find that human language and animal communication are on the same 
spectrum.  
If we keep Grandin`s distinction in mind, Chomsky and other likeminded researchers 
would be in the first camp, and the advocates of symbolic communication research would 
fall into the second camp. 
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The language question plays a significant role in the criticism towards symbolic 
communication research, but there are other faults found in this type of research. Thomas 
A. Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000) has also been a very vocal critic of symbolic communications 
projects and he finds these projects to have other even wider problems than language 
defining. 
Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000, p. 50) distinguishes between three main issues with these 
projects: 
1. „Inaccurate observations and/or recordings of ape behaviours; 
2. The over interpretation of ape performances; 
3. The unintended modification of all animal`s behaviour in the direction of the desired 
results―.  
Within these three issues, we can already see how Sebeok`s criticism might touch on 
the objectivity question. All of the above points, if they are true, in my opinion speak about 
wider problem – the loss of objectivity. I will discuss each of them separately.  
Firstly, about inaccurate observations Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000, pp. 50-52) finds that the 
expectations of the experimenter can greatly affect how they interpret or score responses of 
their subjects. They want to see their subject succeed and therefore interpret the signs made 
by animal in that light. Sebeok also finds that since the assistants teaching the animals have 
sole purpose of inducing in the animals certain carefully programmed communication 
skills, they are more likely to see those skills where there actually are none. Furthermore 
the assistants have frequent discussions with other assistants and project leaders, they read 
each other‘s notes and therefore the chances of the researchers influencing each other are 
fairly high. For example an assistant can use a certain tool when the sign for that object has 
been reported by another observer.  
Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000, p. 56) points out that usually researchers fail to take into 
account natural behaviour of their experimental animals, mistaking species-typical 
reactions to humans for learned responses. For example, the vocabulary of each ape 
includes signs as pick (signed by picking a part of their anatomy), hug (signed by 
hugging), tickle (signed by tickling), kiss (signed by kissing), scratch (signed by 
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scratching), and others. The term „sign― is inappropriate since these behaviours do not 
stand for or represent any referent, they simply are activities exhibited by wild apes.  
Symbolic communication research projects often invite outside observers to see their 
results, but for Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000, pp. 84-85) even that is not helpful. Outsiders are 
dependent on the project members for the bulk of the information they receive during their 
visits, even if they are fluent in ASL, they do not have any experience with the animals and 
they cannot determine which actions are natural to the species and which ones the result of 
training. Because of their lack of expertise in animal behaviour they might be distracted by 
the non-signing behaviour of the animal and the hosts.  
Secondly Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000, pp. 58-71) turns to the over interpretation of animals‘ 
performance. He finds that it is reasonable to apply the principle of Ockham`s razor in the 
case of animal language. If the animals‘ behaviour can be explained in other or simpler 
terms, we should do that. For Sebeok, it is more likely that the scientists have over 
interpreted animals behaviour than that the animal is actually using language. He finds that 
we may be dealing with the Clever Hans Effect. 
Hans was a horse in the beginning of 20th century who allegedly was very good at 
math, but later it was found out that Hans could read subtle involuntary queues given by 
his owner. Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000, pp. 60-62) says that we cannot really know if the animal 
is only imitating humans or really trying to convey a message, he himself thinks its 
imitation. He also remains sceptical about researchers reporting jokes, metaphors and 
insults in their communications with animals. For Sebeok it is more likely that the 
scientists are trying to find some sort of explanation for the animal‘s erratic behaviour.  
Thirdly, Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000, pp. 72-75) brings out a possibility that scientists have 
unintentionally modified animal behaviour. He finds it highly likely, since most of the 
animal language research groups are very close-knitted, almost family-like entities. 
Animals have their favourites and so do scientists. For Sebeok this raises the clever Hans 
question again, since it is unclear how well animals can read humans body language, it is 
likely that in the case of „favourites― it is easy for the animal to get cues from 
experimenter. This doesn`t mean that there is some language involved. 
de Waal (2016) has also raised similar concerns:  
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It is hard to evaluate linguistic skills if we never get to see the raw data, such as unedited 
videotapes, and hear only cherry-picked interpretations by loving caretakers. It also doesn`t help 
that whenever apes produce wrong answers, their interpreters assume that they have a sense of 
humor, exclaiming „Oh, stop kidding around!― or „You funny gorilla!― (de Waal, 2016, p.105) 
According to Sebeok and de Waal it would seem then that symbolic communications 
projects have far deeper problems besides the language question. If the scientists are really 
too close to their test animals and co-workers, if the outside observers are compromised, if 
only favourable data is presented and animal`s mistakes are explained away, these projects 
cannot be regarded as very objective. Without objectivity they are also far from scientific 
and their results and data lose their credibility. 
Before making a final decision about the objectivity of symbolic communication 
research we should look if the researchers have presented a plausible answer to the critics, 
since according to Longino`s social objectivity, answering to criticism was paramount for 
objectivity. In the next sub-chapters I will assess the answers to the critics by the 
researchers in symbolic communication and their sympathizers.  
3.3 Answering to criticism 
I will first discuss John Duprè`s (Dupré, 2002) response to Sebeok`s (Sebeok, 2000) 
points of criticism outlined in the previous sub-chapter. Dupré has tried to answer to all 
three lines of Sebeok`s criticism.  
Firstly, in the case of inaccurate observations and/or recordings Dupré (Dupré, 2002, 
pp. 240-244) finds that if some sort of communication is supposed to happen, certain 
amount of interpretation is needed. If what the ape is producing really is a kind of a 
language, we should not be surprised by the listener having to contribute a measure of 
interpretation to the communicative interaction. Literal transcriptions of conversations 
even between linguistically competent human adults typically look very different from 
grammatically correct written language, but nobody doubts that communication took place. 
Utterances of human children are even more aberrant, but we are prepared to believe that 
the parent understands what is being said.  
Secondly, Dupré (Dupré, 2002, pp. 240-244) finds that we may not deal so much with 
the over interpretation, but fundamental conflicts between intrinsic features of this kind of 
research and commonly held ideals of scientific enquiry. This encompasses the idea, that 
data requiring interpretation is scientifically unacceptable. Dupré reminds us that all data is 
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interpreted in the light of some theoretical background. In the case of animal language 
research projects that background is that animals are trying to say something. 
Unfortunately that is exactly what the critics are denying missing the point that it would be 
impossible to investigate animals‘ sayings without at least a hypothesis that they are trying 
to say something. Dupré also brings out that it might be impossible for scientists to stay 
completely dispassionate and detached. In the case of animal language research projects it 
seems to be inevitable part of this kind of research for scientists to not be completely 
dispassionate and detached. They are trying to communicate with live and active beings 
after all. He states that much of human learning might be inaccessible to a thoroughly 
disinterested and objective study.  
Thirdly, in the case of unintended modification, Dupré (Dupré, 2002, pp. 240-244) 
finds that it seems very difficult to devise experiments that eliminate every possible 
channel of communication other than that intended by researchers. Animal language 
research projects are facing a methodological dilemma: the more controlled and 
predictable the animals behaviour is, the harder it is to fend off the accusation of 
manipulation, but when animal is given more freedom, and it`s utterances are spontaneous 
and uncontrolled, the reports of animals behaviour are called „anecdotal―. Sceptics aren`t 
convinced either way. We should pay attention to what is being investigated – interaction 
between two intelligent subjects.  
All of these counterarguments are very good and could be indicators of the 
peculiarities of these types of researches. Nonetheless the worry about objectivity still 
remains. Even if interpretation and social interaction with animals is a necessary 
component of animal research it doesn‘t mean that scientists should present only 
favourable data and explain the mistakes away.  
Dupré does not say it explicitly, but it seems to me that when he is talking about 
conflicts between intrinsic features of this kind of research and commonly held ideals of 
scientific enquiry he might mean absolute objectivity and its unsuitability to animal 
research. Absolute objectivity was indeed hostile towards subjective input in science and it 
might be a big contributor into commonly held ideals about scientific enquiry. But as 
concluded in the first chapter, absolute objectivity is not attainable in most type of 
scientific research, and therefore general understanding of science assuming absolute 
objectivity is misleading.  
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If we see this problem in the light of Longino`s social objectivity, we do not have such 
a sharp conflict between the ideals of scientific inquiry and this type of animal research, 
since social objectivity does not demand the same level of detachment as absolute 
objectivity. The question now is whether according to Longino`s social objectivity the 
symbolic communication research projects are objective? In the next sub-chapter I will 
concentrate more closely to this objectivity question.  
3.4 Objectivity of symbolic communication research 
I will start this sub-chapter with a story forwarded by de Waal (de Waal, 2016). In 
2014, when Robin Williams died, gorilla Koko was said to be mourning the man also. This 
could be a plausible claim, because Koko was said to be close friends with the actor. What 
makes this claim problematic, is that Koko and Robin Williams had only met once, thirteen 
years before, and the only evidence of Koko`s grief was a picture of sombre looking Koko. 
This grieving claim is one example of inflated claims that the symbolic communication 
researches do and these claims are reason why the field of talking apes has bad reputation. 
de Waal concludes, that: ―There is too much of this going around and too little hard-nosed 
science‖. (de Waal, 2016, pp. 105-106) 
I think that one of the main reasons why symbolic communication systems projects are 
not taken so seriously is that the scientists who have led them have lost their objectivity. 
The story of Koko grieving somebody whom she has only met once shows quite clearly 
that the objectivity of these researchers might be compromised.  
Instead of claiming something implausible it would be more reasonable to claim that 
Koko was affected by the mood of the researchers (de Waal, 2016, p. 106). To illustrate 
this further, I will take a look into typical setting of an animal language research project. 
Typically these projects take place in a social setting, even homelike environment. The 
leaders of a project are usually a married couple or relatives. Work with the animals has 
been on-going for decades and the lead scientists and their followers together with the 
animals have formed a tight-knitted community. Even if outside observers are on the 
premises, they are first given training on what do they see or they are given interpretations 
on the animal behaviour they are observing. All of this was mentioned by Sebeok (Sebeok, 
2000) too. 
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We can already see how such a setting raises some serious issues about objectivity. 
Can we talk about objectivity in such a case at all? If we are dealing with a very close and 
even isolated community, it is plausible to assume that this community has its own 
standards – the standards about which tests to conduct, how they are to be conducted, 
which animals are to be tested and by whom. And there are obviously standards about how 
to interpret the data collected with such testing. All of this does not necessarily mean that 
the objectivity of the group is compromised. 
If we think back to Megill`s (Megill, 1994) four senses of objectivity, the symbolic 
communication systems projects might fall under the category of the disciplinary sense of 
objectivity. Consensus among the researchers would then give this group their standards 
for objectivity. All would be well if we could just draw the line there and leave things like 
that. Unfortunately we cannot do that. 
Science and research is not carried out in a vacuum. Besides your own research group 
there are other groups and scientists out there. If we settle for disciplinary objectivity then 
we have the problem of relativism raising its head. We either accept that every group has 
its own objectivity, thus gaining a great number of accounts of objectivity which might be 
incompatible with each other, or try to find a more general approach. As indicated in 
chapter 1, the absolute sense of objectivity is not helpful in this respect. Symbolic 
communication research does not fare any better in that regard.  
The problem with absolute objectivity is that animal research is bound to have some 
element of subjective in it. Like John Dupré (Dupré, 2002) pointed out, it might be 
impossible for the scientists to remain completely dispassionate and detached. 
Unfortunately absolute objectivity does not allow the subjective element in it, making 
animal research not objective in that regard. 
I have chosen Longino`s (Longino, 1990) social objectivity, since it is universal on the 
one hand, and allows taking the subjective elements in science into account on the other. 
Now the question remains whether symbolic communication research projects are 
objective according to social objectivity. 
According to Longinos objectivity, animal language research projects are not strictly 
objective. According to social objectivity, criticism is a necessary requirement for 
objectivity. In previous sub-chapters I outlined some of the criticism towards the symbolic 
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communication research projects, and also possible answers to this criticism given by 
Dupré. In this sub-chapter I will elaborate it. 
Symbolic communication research projects mostly fail according to the third criticism 
criterion of Longino`s objectivity – community response. They have answered to criticism, 
but at the same time, there seems to be no change in their research taking notice of that 
criticism. There seems to be a sort of stalemate between the animal researchers and their 
critics. Criticism is presented and some sort of answer is given, and then the research goes 
on like nothing has happened. Such an attitude is problematic for objectivity, since it 
means that scientist`s individual beliefs override anything that might come from the 
outside. This is also problematic for the development of the research, since in such a 
stalemate there can be no real development, only repetition of the same thing over and over 
again. In answering to criticism we can see how the close relationship of symbolic 
communication research groups becomes a hindrance not strength.  
One example of symbolic communication research advocates answer to criticism is 
presented by Roger S. Fouts and Deborah H. Fouts (Fouts, Fouts, 1993) who both work 
with the famous chimpanzee Washoe.  
They find that the fault lies in human arrogance. We want to be special and therefore 
discriminate against every other species who might rob us of our special status. Human 
arrogance is to blame for the reason, that symbolic communication research is not taken 
seriously or not seriously enough. They trace this arrogance back to René Descartes, who 
depicted animals as unthinking and unfeeling machines. (Fouts, Fouts, 1993, pp. 30-31) 
It might be true, that due to the philosophical tradition of Cartesians we might not be 
so inclined to accept the reports of talking animals. But is human arrogance here really the 
reason? Critics like Sebeok or de Waal seem to be more concerned about the muddied data 
that the symbolic communication research scientists present, not that the animals are 
somehow beneath us or Cartesian machines.  
One other problem with referring to Cartesian tradition is that Descartes himself had 
quite conflicting views about animals. Yes, they were machines, like a human body was a 
machine. They could not speak and they could not reason, but they were not unfeeling. 
They could feel pain, heat, hunger, fear and joy. (Guerrini, 2007, p.125) It is important to 
keep that in mind while referring to Descartes. 
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So, Fouts´ and Fouts` counterargument misses their mark and raises questions about 
the authors themselves. Instead of delving in the arguments of their opponents, they 
announce, that all who disagree with them are arrogant. This example of a 
counterargument to criticism about symbolic communication research shows how 
advocates of said research concentrate on the wrong things in the light of criticism. Instead 
of calling disbelievers arrogant, the debate could be solved by presenting and analysing the 
data that the critics are asking for. Moreover, the stance that animals do not have language 
like humans do does not necessarily stem from arrogance.  
de Waal (de Waal, 2016, p. 106) has said: 
We honestly have no evidence for symbolic communication, equally rich and multifunctional as 
ours, outside our species. It seems to be our own magic well, something we are exceptionally good 
at. Other species are very capable of communicating inner processes, such as emotions and 
intentions, or coordinating actions and plans by means of nonverbal signals, but their 
communication is neither symbolized nor endlessly flexible like language.  
de Waal´s position stems from lack of evidence, not from arrogance. Symbolic 
communication research has been around for a long time, over thirty years, and we still do 
not have any good, reliable evidence that animals have language similar to human 
language. So it is quite reasonable to assume, that animals do not have language or at least, 
that their language is not like human language. It does not mean that they are somehow 
worse than humans in that regard, it just means that animals do not have the need for a 
complicated symbolic communication system. 
de Waal (de Waal, 2016) points out on many occasions that animals are much better at 
reading expressions and body language than humans are. They are so good at it, that it 
makes us feel like they understand what we are saying to them. But actually they just 
follow our body language. They have no need for symbolic communication on human 
scale, since they are already masters of other type of communication – the body language. 
Animal`s expertise in reading body language could be one explanation as to how they 
could excel in language testing. They read the involuntary cues that the experimenters 
unwillingly give them. Even if body language expertise cannot explain fully the behaviour 
of signing apes, it is one possible alternative explanation to apes having language. At least 
it could be a worthwhile research direction. Unfortunately symbolic communication 
research advocates usually do not consider this possible explanation.    
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Francine Patterson and Wendy Gordon (Patterson, Gordon, 1993, p. 61), who work 
with the famous gorilla Koko, have also explained the criticism towards their work through 
critics needs to defend the uniqueness of human language. Apes threaten that uniqueness; 
therefore their claims about ape language are not taken seriously.  
This line of defence for the symbolic communication research is similar to Fouts` and 
Fouts` (Fouts, Fouts, 1993) line of defence albeit a bit milder. It could be true that some 
critics want to defend the uniqueness of human language, but this counterargument misses 
its target if we consider Sebeok`s or de Waal`s arguments. If the critics are pointing out 
problems with data interpretation or even data tampering, then an argument about the 
defence via the uniqueness of human language does not help here. It just shows that there 
could be serious problems of miscommunication between the two opposing parties.  
This miscommunication could be a sign of problems with fulfilling Longino`s second 
criterion of criticism: the shared standards. Under shared standards Longino (Longino, 
1990, pp. 77-78) means that members of scientific community uphold shared public 
standards or criteria. Only if there are such shared standards, can criticism be relevant to 
those who are criticized.  
Since researchers of the symbolic communication systems seem to dismiss or 
misunderstand the criticism directed at them, it could mean that their standards are 
different from those of the critics. Given the close-knittedness of these research 
communities, it is quite plausible since this close community has also become a somewhat 
closed community. Misdirected answers to criticism seem to indicate that. If it is so, then 
there could not be a meaningful dialogue between the critics and the criticized parties. And 
it also means that the objectivity of criticized parties is compromised. For objectivity, 
responsiveness to criticism is necessary.  
Longino (Longino, 1990) stresses that even if research is criticized it does not mean 
that scientists should give up on it. What it does mean is to review your work in the light of 
this criticism. After all, someone from the outside of a research project might notice 
something yourself researcher is blind or oblivious to.  
In the case of symbolic communication research projects, no such revision is done. 
Ignoring criticism is a striking sign of compromised objectivity. It is commendable, that 
the researchers have not given up on their positions or research, but at the same time, 
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clinging blindly to questionable theories and interpretations of data is not a good solution. 
In the long run, it does not help the research program to progress or researchers to acquire 
new and more reliable data.   
And if the tests are not objective, the test results also are not reliable. We never can be 
sure that these results are given us in an accurate and unmodified form. It is quite possible, 
that the results of these tests have been misinterpreted in a favourable light, without 
considering alternative interpretations. As Sebeok (Sebeok, 2000) points out: everyone 
wants to see their favourites to succeed.  
In conclusion of the chapter, we must admit that symbolic communication researches 
have some serious issues with their objectivity. In the light of Longino`s social objectivity 
these research projects are not really objective since they have problems with shared 
standards of criticism and community‘s response to criticism. This does not mean that all 
of this kind of animal research projects face the difficulties, but some of the landmark 
projects in the field, such as the project Washoe and the project Koko have lost their 
objectivity. The unfounded claims about their test animal´s capabilities like the grieving 
Koko story and the insufficient reaction to criticism illustrate this loss of objectivity. And 
since the star projects in the field are not objective, the whole field becomes compromised 
as the star projects receive more attention than less known projects. Unfortunately this also 
means that the failings of the star projects overshadow the other projects.  
In the next chapter I will look into mindreading experiments. Similarly to symbolic 
communication research, also mindreading experiments have a long history. It is to see if 
the lack of objectivity is a problem in only symbolic communication research or if the lack 
of objectivity could be a wider problem in animal studies. 
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4. Mindreading experiments 
In this chapter, I will turn to animal mind reading tests. These tests also have a long 
history behind them and they have attracted many supporters as well as many critics. 
Mindreading experiments also demand quite close interaction and training between the 
animals and scientists. In this regard, they are quite similar to symbolic communication 
projects. First I will give a brief introduction to animal mind reading, then I will look at the 
criticism of these studies and lastly I will assess the objectivity of these tests.  
4.1 What is animal mind reading? 
Besides humans there are many species that are social animals. For an animal to be 
successful in a competitive social world, it would need some sort of understanding of the 
minds of others. (Andrews, 2016) 
In this context, the term ―theory of mind‖ comes from psychologists David Premack 
and Guy Woodruff. They were interested in whether the chimpanzee could attribute beliefs 
and desires to others in order to predict and explain their behaviour, as humans do. They 
wanted to know if a chimpanzee understands the behaviour of others as being caused by 
propositional attitudes. (Andrews, 2016)  
Theory of mind most simply put means ascribing mental states (beliefs, desires) to 
oneself and to other agents. Animal mindreading research has the potential to uncover and 
solve many debates about mindreading. (Heyes, 2015) Peter Carruthers (Carruthers, 2011, 
p. 254) finds that if we have strong evidence of animal mindreading then this would 
indicate that mindreading in humans could be evolutionary.  
Wimmer and Perner designed the false belief task, which became a standard test for 
theory of mind:  
Children watched a show in which a puppet named Maxi puts away a piece of chocolate in a box 
before leaving the room. While Maxi is out, his mother finds the chocolate and moves it to a 
cupboard. Maxi returns to the scene, the show is stopped, and children are asked to predict where 
Maxi will go to look for his chocolate. If the child says Maxi will look in the cupboard, she fails 
the test, and thus shows that she doesn‘t have a theory of mind. If the child says Maxi will look in 
the box, she passes; passing the task shows that the child has a theory of mind, because she 
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demonstrates that she can attribute mental states and use them to predict Maxi‘s behavior. 
(Andrews, 2016) 
Testing theory of mind in children seems quite clear and doable, since children can 
answer to the questions about the situation they are viewing. But how could we test similar 
knowledge in animals? Cecilia Heyes (Heyes, 2015) lists three types of experiments that 
also illustrate the history of animal mindreading research. They are false belief/conditional 
discrimination training; seeing/conditional discrimination training and transfer tests; and 
―seeing‖/tests only. I will discuss each of them in greater detail.  
First types of tests that Heyes (Heyes, 2015, pp. 314-315) lists, the false 
belief/conditional discrimination training experiments, were popular in the 70s and 80s. 
These tests were conducted by Woodruff and Premack who were interested in the 
chimpanzees‘ ability to deceive. They wanted to know, if the apes could induce a person to 
hold false belief about the location of food. In the trials, they first placed food in one of the 
two containers visible, but out of reach to the chimpanzee. Then a human trainer entered 
the room and searched the container that the chimpanzee was indicating to. If the trainer 
was dressed in green he/she was cooperative and gave the food to chimpanzee. If the 
trainer was dressed in white, they were competitive and they kept the food for themselves. 
Chimpanzees learned the difference and pointed toward the container with food when the 
cooperative trainer was present, and towards the empty container in the presence of 
competitive trainer.  
Heyes (Heyes, 2015, p. 315) notes that Premack and others recognized from the start 
that such behaviour could be induced by more visual clues than mental states. The 
chimpanzees could have instead learned that in the presence of green trainer they were 
rewarded if they pointed to the container with food and in the presence of the white trainer 
there was reward if they pointed to the empty container. Nonetheless, these types of 
experiments launched the animal mindreading research enterprise.  
According to Heyes (Heyes, 2015, pp. 314-315) in the 1990s seeing/conditional 
discrimination training and transfer tests were devised to avoid the ambiguity of Woodruff 
and Premack tests. Chimpanzees were first given conditional discrimination training and 
afterwards a transfer test. In the training phase in the presence of the chimpanzee and one 
trainer (Knower) food was placed into one of the four cups. The chimpanzee could see the 
Knower and that food were placed into one of the cups, but not at which cup. Then the 
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second trainer, the Guesser, entered the room, and each trainer pointed at a cup — the 
Knower at the cup with food, and the Guesser randomly at one of the other three cups. The 
chimpanzee was then allowed to select one cup to search for the food. If the chimpanzee 
selected the cup pointed by the Knower it could eat the food, but if it selected any other 
cup, no food was given.  
To avoid chimpanzees using physical cues the roles of the Knower and the Guesser 
were switched around and a transfer test were both trainers were present was also given. In 
the transfer tests the Guesser had a bag over its head. Chimpanzees learned to choose the 
cup indicated by the Knower, but at the same time these results still did not provide strong 
evidence about mindreading. Possibility of the apes using visual indicators was still very 
high. (Heyes, 2015, p. 315) 
In the 2000s Tomasello and his Leipzig colleagues focused on `Seeing`/tests only to 
assess the chimpanzees` understanding of `seeing` and `knowing`. They used in their 
testing competitive feeding situations without any prior training done on apes. (Heyes, 
2015, p. 315) 
At the beginning of each trial in the competitive feeding paradigm, a subordinate chimpanzee (the 
subject) and a dominant chimpanzee (the putative target of mindreading) were confined on 
opposite sides of an enclosure containing two occluding objects . In all trials, a human trainer 
entered the enclosure and placed food on the subordinate‘s side of one of the occluders, and in 
some trials the trainer re-entered the enclosure 5–10 s later and moved the food to the 
subordinate‘s side of the other occluder. In all conditions, the door to the subordinate‘s cage was 
open during the baiting event(s). The conditions varied according to whether the dominant‘s door 
was open or closed, and therefore whether the subordinate could see the dominant, during the 
baiting event(s). After baiting, both of the chimpanzees were released into the enclosure, with the 
subordinate being given a head start. (Heyes, 2015, p. 315) 
Leipzig group interprets the results of these tests as evidence that animals have some 
understanding of the relationship between `seeing‘ and `knowing`. Subordinates 
approached the food more often, when the dominants door had been closed. If the 
dominants door was left open subordinates didn`t try so hard, assuming that the dominant 
saw where the food was placed and, that they would lose it anyway. (Heyes, 2015, pp. 315-
316) 
These three types of experiments illustrate the developments and difficulties in the 
mindreading research. In the next sub-chapter I will look at the criticism of these tests. 
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4.2 Criticism of mindreading research 
Heyes (Heyes, 2015, pp. 316-317) notes that these three experiments illustrate three 
trends in animal mindreading research. Firstly, the bar has been lowered. Secondly, 
methodological standards have declined. Thirdly, the social structure of research has 
changed. Heyes finds that the research on animal mindreading has declined and she blames 
underlying theoretical and methodological problems.  
It is no longer clear what research on animal mindreading is looking for (theoretical problem), and 
consequently it is not clear how the quarry can be hunted down (methodological problem). (Heyes, 
2015, p. 317) 
Overall this paints a picture of research in crisis – without the understanding of what it 
is that the scientists are investigating and how they should do it.  
de Waal (de Waal, 2016) criticizes mindreading experiments for underestimating the 
role of body language. Chimpanzees can read the body language of other chimpanzees to 
get clues about the knowledge that the other chimpanzee might possess, such as the 
location of hidden food. Because of that de Waal also has a problem with the terminology 
in mindreading experiments: 
The central question became whether apes or children hold a theory about the minds of others. I 
have trouble with this terminology, too, because it makes it sound as if we understand others 
through a rational evaluation not unlike the way we figure out physical processes, such as how 
water freezes or how continents drift apart. It sounds far too cerebral and disembodied. I seriously 
doubt that we, or any other animal, grasp the mental states of someone else at such an abstract 
level. (de Waal, 2016, pp. 131-132) 
According to de Waal it would then seem that the theory part of mindreading 
experiments might be presupposing too much from the animals and even us.  
Heyes (Heyes, 2015) has tried to find a solution for mindreading experiments, to help 
the research get out of this crisis. To solve the theoretical problem, she advocates the 
minimal solution. It is: 
The ‗minimal solution‘ raises the possibility that, rather than involving metarepresentation of 
propositional attitudes, animal mindreading involves the representation of mental states as 
relations between agents, objects and locations. (Heyes, 2015, p. 320) 
If we take mindreading in the light of the minimal solution, then we do not have the 
problem of no creature qualifying as a mind reader. At the same time, this concept is still 
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difficult enough to be worth researching. If we would conceptualize mindreading in a very 
vague and general term, then every being could be a mind reader, and the necessity of 
researching this phenomenon would be nonexistent. So, the minimal solution could be an 
acceptable term on which to ground further research.  
Heyes (Heyes, 2015) also finds that to overcome the methodological problems 
researchers could revert back to the more demanding tests of the 1990s. They might be 
more bothersome and time consuming to set up, but we could get better and clearer results 
from them.  
de Waal (de Waal, 2016, p. 146) has pointed out that one big problem with theory of 
mind tests is that apes are asked to guess what humans do and do not know. But the apes 
have every reason to believe that human caretakers are all knowing. Tests with human 
presence only test ape`s theory of the human mind. De Waal notes that the field started to 
get real results only after pitting apes against other apes.  
Daniel J. Povinelly and Jennifer Vonk (Povinelly, Vonk, 2003) find that the problem 
with mind-reading experiments is that the test results used to prove the existence of 
mindreading could at the same time instead be proving behaviour – reading in animals. 
They think that the solution would be to devise such a test where the animal is given an 
experience that they cannot predict from the environment and the scientists then can 
research if the animal understands the nature of that experience.  
Carruthers (Carruthers, 2011, pp. 258-259) points out that although in many 
experiments when interpreting the result simplicity could be a better option while 
theorizing about animal intellectual capabilities it can be a double-edged sword. As an 
alternative to mindreading scientists have presented behaviour – rule explanations. This 
means that instead of mindreading animals are following some behavioural rule that helps 
them get similar test results to mindreading. The problem is that this simpler explanation of 
animal behaviour might not be so simple after all since in complex situations the behaviour 
– rule explanation needs to postulate many distinct rules and becomes less plausible. 
Carruthers finds that instead of behaviour – rule explanations it would be more reasonable 
to assume that animals have a stage-one mindreading account.  
Through all of these abovementioned criticisms we can see that there is a vivid 
discussion about the possibility of mindreading going on. Researchers present their 
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theories and hypotheses about animal mindreading according to the data and analyse the 
answers of their opponents. There are also propositions about improving or modifying the 
tests to get better and clearer results. 
Keeping in mind the aim of the present study, one may wonder whether the 
mindreading experiments are objective. This is the topic of next sub-chapter. 
4.3 Objectivity of mindreading research 
Mindreading research has to face many problems but the real question is: do these 
problems in mindreading experiments speak about lost objectivity? I think that the answer 
for that question is not really.  
If to refer back to chapter three, where objectivity of symbolic communication 
research was discussed, we can see a clear difference between these two kinds of inquiry. 
This is answering to criticism. In the case of symbolic communication research, the 
criticism did not change the ways how the experiments were conducted or how the data 
was interpreted. In the theory of mind research, scientists tried and are still trying, to come 
up with new ways to explore mindreading in light of criticism or ambiguous test results. 
Most of the time, alternative explanations were taken into account or given serious 
considerations. 
Symbolic communication and mindreading research both have problems, but at the 
opposite ends. Symbolic communication research is too unified; alternatives are either 
ignored or not considered. Mindreading experiments consider alternatives and try to devise 
better tests, but the disagreements have led research into crisis. Researchers are not sure 
any more about what they are studying and how. If one kind of research is too unified, the 
other is not unified enough. Symbolic communication research speaks about the dangers of 
absolute agreement and mindreading research about the dangers of disagreement.  
Nonetheless, on the objective scale mindreading experiments fare better than symbolic 
communication research. To remind Longino`s (Longino, 1990) social objectivity, one 
main point for remaining objective is criticism and answering to that. Mindreading 
research has answered to criticism and also revised its hypotheses, tests and theories in 
light of that criticism. Like Heyes (Heyes, 2015) pointed out: even from the start of the 
first experiments, the scientists have been aware of alternative explanations to their test 
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results. In reaction to this, they have tried to devise better, more conclusive tests to 
eliminate the ambiguity of test results.  
In conclusion of this chapter, one may admit that mindreading research is objective 
according to Longino`s social objectivity. Despite the problems in mindreading research, 
there is a possibility of overcoming them, since the scientists are mindful of the criticism 
and alternative perspectives.  
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5. Conclusion 
The central question of my thesis has been whether animal research is objective? 
Answer to that is yes, but depending on the account of objectivity. I have found good 
reasons to choose Longino`s account of social objectivity. I have analyzed two types of 
major research projects in animal research in light of the account of objectivity.  
One of these research projects, symbolic communication research, turned out to be not 
very objective. A central requirement of social objectivity is answering to criticism. 
Symbolic communication research projects fails in that regard. Their answers are either 
inconclusive or miss their target. Another sign of failure in reaction to criticism is that 
these research projects have remained quite unchanged for over thirty years.  
The other research project, the mindreading research, fares better. Although this 
research also has its difficulties, there has been at least clear reaction to criticism. 
Researchers have tried to devise better tests in light of criticism and sought alternative 
explanations to test results. According to Longino`s criteria of social objectivity, 
mindreading research is objective.  
So, overall it is possible to remain objective while researching animals. There is a 
subjective element in animal research but this subjectivity can be limited and controlled by 
reacting to criticism. In the end it is scientific community as a whole who decides via 
criticism if some research is objective or not. Criticism and reacting to criticism help 
scientific research to remain scientific and objective. Animal research is no different in that 
regard. There are studies that are not very objective in animal research and also studies that 
are objective. In light of social objectivity, the answer to my main question in this thesis is 
yes, it is possible to research animals objectively.   
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6. Summary 
In my thesis I have been interested in the objectivity of animal research. Since animal 
studies have an inherent subjective element, some of these studies are considered not 
objective or even unscientific. My first step for inquiring this problem has been clarifying 
the concept of objectivity. I found that the common understanding of objectivity and 
corresponding idea of absolute objectivity in science are not suitable for the nature of 
scientific research. I agree with Helen E. Longino that science is a social activity by nature 
and therefore objectivity should also be understood socially and not individually like in the 
classical understanding of objectivity. Secondly, I used examples of two research projects 
in animal studies to see if animal research could be objective on the same grounds as other 
sciences. In the symbolic communication research the leading researchers in the field were 
unable to react to criticism, thus compromising the objectivity of those studies. 
Mindreading experiments turned out to be objective, since scientists were open to 
criticism, alternative hypotheses and a lively discussion between the critics and scientists 
were achieved. From these examples, I concluded that animal studies can be objective if 
the scientists are participating in an open critical discussion. 
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Loomauuringud ja objektiivsus: kokkuvõte 
Oma magistritöös huvitusin ma loomauuringute objektiivsusest. Loomade uurimisega 
seondub  interaktsioonist tulenev subjektiivne element, mis on vastuolus tavapärase 
arusaamaga objektiivsusest. Selle vastolu tõttu peetakse mõningaid loomauuringuid 
ebaobjektiivseks või suisa pseudoteaduslikuks.  Esimeseks sammuks selle probleemi 
uurimisel selgitasin objektiivsuse mõistet. Selle käigus leidsin, et tavapärane arusaam 
objektiivsusest ja sellega kattuv arusaam absoluutsest objektiivsusest teaduses ei sobi 
tegelikult teadustöö loomusega. Nõustun Helen E. Longinoga, et teadus ja teadusloome on 
oma olemuselt sotsiaalsed ja seetõttu peaks ka objektiivsust mõistma sotsiaalselt, mitte 
individuaalselt nagu klassikalises arusaamas objektiivsusest. Minu teiseks sammuks oli 
uurida konkreetseid loomauuringute näiteid sotsiaalse objektiivsuse valguses, et näha kas 
loomauuringud saavad olla objektiivsed samadel alustel kui teised teadused. Keskendusin 
kahele suurele uurimissuunale loomauuringutes: loomade keeleprojektidele ja 
mõttelugemise eksperimentidele. Esimene neist, loomade keeleprojektid, ei olnud väga 
objektiivsed, kuna selle ala juhtivate projektide teadlased ei olnud võimelised kriitikale 
adekvaatselt reageerima ning seetõttu oli nende projektide objektiivsus kompromiteeritud. 
Mõttelugemise eksperimendid seevastu osutusid objektiivseteks, kuna uuringute algusest 
peale olid teadlased avatud kriitikale ja alternatiivsetele hüpoteesidele ning kriitikute ja 
teadlaste vahel toimus elav diskusioon, mis pani aluse uutele eksperimentidele ja 
uurimissuundadele. Järeldasin, et loomade uuringud võivad olla hoolimata neis sisalduvast 
subjektiivsest elemendist objektiivsed, kui loomadega tegelevad teadlased osalevad avatud 
kriitilises diskusioonis. 
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